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Abstract—Businesses planning for the post-pandemic world
are looking for innovative ways to protect the health and
welfare of their employees and customers. Wireless technologies
can play a key role in assisting contact tracing to quickly
halt a local infection outbreak and prevent further spread.
In this work, we present a wearable proximity and exposure
notification solution based on a smartwatch that also promotes
safe physical distancing in business, hospitality, or recreational
facilities. Our proximity-based privacy-preserving contact tracing
(P3CT) leverages the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) technology for
reliable proximity sensing, and an ambient signature protocol for
preserving identity. Proximity sensing exploits the received signal
strength (RSS) to detect the user’s interaction and thus classifying
them into low- or high-risk with respect to a patient diagnosed
with an infectious disease. More precisely, a user is notified of
their exposure based on their interactions, in terms of distance
and time, with a patient. Our privacy-preserving protocol uses the
ambient signatures to ensure that users’ identities be anonymized.
We demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed solution through
extensive experimentation.
Index Terms—Bluetooth Low Energy, Disease Outbreak, Phys-
ical Distancing, Proximity, Contact Tracing, Smartwatch
I. INTRODUCTION
MANY industries suspended their daily operations in cor-respondence to the government’s effort in containing
the COVID-19 pandemic. In view of the urgency to resuming
the daily life routine, several countries have started to relax the
restriction so that some industries can resume operation and
have their employees back to normal activities. However, each
industry is expected to implement some preventive measures
to minimize the risk of further outbreaks. Among those pre-
ventive measures, such as temperature checks, face coverings,
and frequent hand washing, contact tracing is deemed essential
in monitoring the interaction between individuals and thus
providing an immediate alert to all those who were exposed
when someone is diagnosed with an infectious disease [1], [2].
An efficient contact tracing approach needs to properly ad-
dress the question of how to monitor the interactions between
employees and customers and how to alert exposed individuals
while preserving the anonymity of the patient. While there
are many smartphone-based contact tracing systems (e.g.,
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Pan European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-
PT) [3], COVID-19 Watch [4], Privacy-Preserving Automated
Contact Tracing (PACT) [5], etc.), these solutions might not
be effective in a workplace because the employee does not
necessarily carry with them the smartphone all the time due to
the inherent nature of the activity. Furthermore, many people
might put the smartphone inside a pocket or backpack, which
increases the difficulty in achieving reliable proximity sensing.
An effective and low-cost contact tracing solution that can
be used by the employee without affecting their activity and
at the same time providing line-of-sight (LOS) signals for
more accurate proximity sensing is necessary. Motivated by
this limitation, this paper proposes a wearable contact tracing
solution based on a low-cost smartwatch, namely proximity-
based privacy-preserving contact tracing (P3CT).
First, we exploit the proximity sensing information com-
puted from the received Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) signals
to monitor the interaction between employees [6]. Second,
we design a privacy-preserving protocol that encapsulates the
BLE packet with an ambient signature packet rather than
the employee’s identity or location-related information. The
main framework describing the contact tracing based on BLE
technology is shown in Fig. 1. Each smartwatch will broadcast
a BLE packet periodically according to a system-defined
interval. Rather than using the conventional two-way BLE
communication channels (i.e., a secure channel for data ex-
change established through a series of pairing and handshaking
processes), the smartwatch uses a non-connectable advertising
channel, which was primarily used by beacon-based applica-
tions, to broadcast the packet. Hence, it is almost impossible
for any malicious device to connect to the smartwatch to access
sensitive information.
When two users are in proximity to each other, that is,
when the smartwatches are within the broadcasting range,
they can listen to the incoming packet and measure the
received signal strength (RSS). The smartwatches will log
the packet including the measured RSS value into their local
storage, as shown in Fig. 1(a). The packet contains the ambient
signature information observed by the individual smartwatch
at particular timestamps. When an individual is diagnosed with
an infectious disease, as shown in Fig. 1(b), the smartwatch
will upload the individual’s own signatures generated for the
past 14 days to the signature database. All the other employees
will download the infected signatures into their smartwatch for
signature matching. In other words, the signature matching
process takes place in the individual smartwatch rather than
the cloud server. In this case, there is no way for others
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Fig. 1. When employees A and B are in proximity to each other, their
smartwatches will log the received BLE packet containing the ambient
signature information into their watch’s local storage. When employee A
is diagnosed with an infectious disease, the watch will upload his/her own
signatures to the signature database. All the other employees can download
those signatures and compare them to a list of signatures they have observed
in the past 14 days. An alert will be triggered when the downloaded signatures
match one of the signatures on the list.
to know who has come into close contact with the infected
person. The smartwatch will automatically trigger an alert
when it found a matched signature. Based on the alert, the
individual will be informed about the necessary actions, such
as self-quarantine, testing, follow-up and monitoring process,
so that further spread of this highly contagious disease can be
prevented.
While it is relatively straightforward to develop such an
application to the smartwatch for contact tracing purposes,
it remains unclear how accurate is the proximity sensing
information estimated through the RSS value and how the
ambient signature information can help to prevent information
leaks. Furthermore, rather than a simple alert when there are
matched signatures, it is more effective to tell the individual
about their exposure risk level based on how close and how
long their exposure was. This is because the risk of an
individual to be infected is low if they spent less than one
second in close proximity to the infected employee compared
to the individual who spent more than one hour in not so close
proximity, yet still relatively near (i.e., the smartwatch still in
the broadcasting range), to the infected employee. Recognizing
the above challenges, we carefully developed our proposed
P3CT that has the following contributions:
• Accurate proximity sensing: this is the first work that
provides a comprehensive investigation about the per-
formance of proximity sensing based on the RSS val-
ues measured by a smartwatch worn by individuals.
While RSS suffers severe attenuation due to the human
body, our empirical analysis verified that we can achieve
satisfactory performance with a carefully implemented
machine learning method. Since the smartwatch is always
worn on the human wrist, it is less challenging for the
smartwatch to provide suitable LOS signals compared to
smartphones.
• Low-cost device: Being a low-cost commercial off-the-
shelf device that is equipped with essential BLE tech-
nology, the smartwatch has become an ideal solution for
privacy-preserving contact tracing. The widely available
software development support allows the workplace to
provide quick yet reliable prototypes for testing prior to
workplace reopening.
• Risk classification: we define the exposure’s risk of a
user based on the interaction duration and distance with
the infectious individual. In contrast to most works that
simply rely on the RSS value as an input feature to train
a classification model, we explore other possible input
features including the number of samples observed by
the smartwatch, the maximum RSS, the minimum RSS,
and the RSS range. Our experiment unveils the effects of
selecting the right features on classification performance.
• Real-time notification and dataset: Our developed ap-
plication can provide real-time notification when the
physical distance is violated. Also, our experimental
results were validated with a real-world dataset that was
collected with a smartwatch worn on the human wrist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides the background related to contact tracing and dis-
cusses its current development. Section III presents our pro-
posed P3CT. Section IV describes the method to classify the
risk level. Section V discusses our experimental evaluations.
Section VI concludes the paper with future works.
II. MOTIVATION TO CONTACT TRACING
Recognizing the urgency to have an effective contact tracing
system, various digital-based solutions, either based on a
smartphone or a smart wearable, have emerged lately.
A. Major Phases of Contact Tracing
During an epidemic of a highly contagious disease such
as COVID-19, it is very likely for anyone to contract the
virus when they interact with an infected individual in close
proximity for a very long time. Contact tracing aims to trace
down this group of people so that they can be aware of their
exposure to the virus and take the necessary action as soon
as possible. We can divide the contact tracing into two major
phases:
1) Interacting Phase: The interacting phase keeps track of
the daily contacts including distance and duration. A contact
tracing system should be able to detect when any two persons
are in proximity to each other at the same time keeping track
of the duration they remain in close proximity. An effective
contact tracing system should be able to detect the proximity
with high accuracy rather than seeking to estimate the exact
distance, which is quite challenging considering the dynamic
movement of humans.
2) Tracing Phase: When a person is diagnosed with the
infectious disease, we need to trace down a list of people
who have been in close contact with the infected person
because they are more likely to get affected. If this group
3of people can be notified promptly, we reduce the chances
for the virus to continue to spread to others. However, many
people are concerned about exposing their identity during
the tracing phase. Hence, a privacy-preserving contact tracing
system should provide these two pieces of information without
disclosing one’s identity.
B. Digital Tools for Contact Tracing
The traditional contact tracing is conducted manually
through in-person interviews and investigations. Such a man-
ual method based on subjective feedback (i.e., feedback from
the infected individual) is unable to gather the precise interac-
tion distance and duration. Furthermore, the investigator might
acquire some sensitive information to identify those people
who have come into close contact. In contrast to the manual
contact tracing, the digital tools for contact tracing can provide
more precise information regarding the interaction distance
and duration, at the same time preserving the individual’s
privacy. To date, the digital-based contact tracing can be
categorized into smartphone or smart wearable-based:
1) Smartphone-Based Contact Tracing: The pervasiveness
of smartphones has made smartphones the most popular choice
when comes into the digital-based contact tracing system. The
rich sensing features embedded in the smartphone provides
a better estimation of interaction distance and duration [7]–
[9]. For example, many works leverage location sensing [10]
and proximity sensing [3] to keep track of the interaction
between any two individuals. There are also works exploiting
the heterogeneous sensing features in a smartphone to improve
the distance estimation [11]. However, most of these works
fail to consider the location of the smartphone during the
interacting phase. While people might carry their smartphone
with them during grocery shopping, the smartphone will be
inside a pocket or a purse most of the time. Hence, the distance
estimation is more complex and can be highly inaccurate for a
contact tracing application. At the same time, people might not
carry the smartphone with them all the time while working.
2) Wearable-Based Contact Tracing: Considered the in-
consistency of smartphones, some companies have started to
exploit the smart wearable approach to contact tracing. The
goal is to resume the working routine with less distraction.
For example, EasyBand [12] presents a wearable solution to
auto contact tracing while encouraging safe social distancing
practice during interaction. However, EasyBand uses a cen-
tralized server for contact tracing, in which all the users’ data
is uploaded to the cloud through TCP/IP connection. Such a
centralized approach is not scalable as all the computations
to find the close contact for all the workers are performed
within the server. Furthermore, there is a high possibility of
information leak if the server is compromised. Our proposed
P3CT, on the other hand, provides a privacy-preserving contact
tracing by keeping no individual information on the cloud
server.
C. Current Development in Contact Tracing
Recognizing the importance of contact tracing in resuming
the normal lifestyle while preventing the further virus out-
break, both government and academia have devoted efforts in
developing a more effective contact tracing solution to fight
against COVID-19.
1) National-Level Efforts: China, South Korea, and Sin-
gapore are among the first countries enforcing digital tools
for contact tracing. China leverages its existing surveillance
strategy to implement a close contact detector based on QR
codes technology [13]. South Korea leverages the location data
(i.e., the GPS data) from the smartphone to detect the distance
of the users and push a notification containing personal details
of the infected individuals to the nearby users [10]. Singapore
developed the TraceTogether application based on BLE signals
on the smartphone to detect the proximity between any two
individuals [14]. While the methods applied by China and
South Korea might be less strict on user’s privacy, Singapore
adopted a more privacy-preserving approach by only tracking
the proximity between users without explicit location infor-
mation.
2) Academia-Level Efforts: There have been a number of
initiatives from industry and academia researchers in deliv-
ering an effective contact tracing solution while preserving
user privacy [15], [16]. For example, Pan European Privacy-
Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) detects the prox-
imity based on the broadcast BLE packet containing a full
anonymous ID [3]. COVID-19 Watch provides automatic alert
the user when they are in contact with the infected individ-
ual [4]. The Privacy-Preserving Automated Contact Tracing
(PACT) exploits the BLE signals in combination with secure
encryption to detect possible contacts while protecting users’
privacy [5].
Most of these initiatives assume that the BLE signals
will work for proximity detection while there are no works
providing a comprehensive study of the accuracy of using BLE
signals for proximity sensing. To bridge the gap, this paper
presents extensive experiments to validate the feasibility of
using BLE signals for proximity detection.
III. PROPOSED PROXIMITY-BASED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
CONTACT TRACING
Our proposed P3CT leverages the BLE technology available
on the smartwatch for proximity sensing. To achieve privacy-
preserving contact tracing, we adopt the following signature
protocol to define the BLE advertising packet.
A. Proximity Sensing with BLE Technology
As a popular short-range communication over the 2.4 GHz
ISM band [17], BLE is readily available in many smart
devices including smartwatches, earphones, smart thermostats,
etc. [18], [19]. BLE communicates through either non-
connectable advertising or connectable advertising [20]. The
latter advertising mode allows another device to request a
secure connection through handshaking. Our proposed P3CT
uses the non-connectable advertising mode, which rejects any
incoming connection requests [21], as the main feature for ex-
posure notification purposes. The non-connectable advertising
mode allows the smartwatch to broadcast a short advertising
packet periodically according to the system-defined advertising
interval, Ta. Upon receiving the packet, the smartwatch can
450 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
-100
-90
-80
-70
-60
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
-100
-90
-80
-70
-60
Fig. 2. Variation of RSS over distance without and with filtering.
measure the RSS and use it to estimate the proximity. More
precisely, the RSS is inversely proportional to the square of
the distance according to the inverse square law [22], [23]:
Pr ∝ 1
dn
(1)
where Pr is the signal strength in dBm, d is the distance be-
tween any two smartwatches, and n is the path loss exponent.
Even though the RSS-distance relationship holds for the
signal in the free space, the RSS values suffer a great variation
in practical environments owing to the multipath [24] and
body shadowing effects [25], [26]. We can minimize the signal
variation by applying signal filtering methods, such as moving
average. As shown in Fig. 2, the RSS values at each distance
are more distinct and with less variation when a moving
average is applied as compared to the raw RSS data. While
we can set a cut-off threshold, for example, any value greater
than −75 dBm as being in close proximity, such a thresholding
approach will result in high false-negative with raw RSS value
(i.e. the system will not record the contact as close proximity)
and high false-positive with filtered RSS value (i.e. the system
will record the contact in close proximity while it is not).
Rather than using a thresholding approach, we exploit machine
learning methods to proximity sensing and further classify the
sensing output into high-risk and low-risk.
B. Privacy-Preserving Signature Protocol
We propose a signature protocol that constructs a signature
vector that fits into the length-constrained advertising packet
(i.e., the available payload is only 31 bytes). Specifically, each
smartwatch is configured to execute the following functions:
i. Signature generation: The smartphone scans for the ambi-
ent environmental features. These features are selectively
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Fig. 3. Timing diagram for the advertising, scanning and signature generation
activities. All the generated and observed signatures will be logged in the local
database, together with a timestamp τ .
processed to generate a unique signature that fits into the
31 bytes advertising payload. The signature is updated
every few minutes.
ii. Signature broadcasting: The smartphone broadcasts the
advertising packet containing the unique signature period-
ically according to the advertising interval Ta. The packet
is broadcasted through the non-connectable advertising
channels.
iii. Signatures observation: The smartphone scans the three
advertising channels to listen for the advertising packet
broadcast by the neighboring smartphones. The scanning
is performed in between the broadcasting events.
The signature is a 31-dimensional transformed vector con-
taining the ambient environmental features. Upon the gener-
ation of the signature, the smartwatch will encapsulate the
signature information into its advertising packet and broadcast
the packet through the non-connectable advertising channels.
The nearby smartwatches can see the packet when they scan
on those advertising channels where the packet is transmitted.
The timing diagram for the advertising, scanning, and sig-
nature generation activities, in which each activity is triggered
periodically according to its interval, i.e., generation interval
Tg , advertising interval Ta, and scanning interval Ts, is shown
in Fig. 3. Given Ts, the smartwatch will only stay active to
listen for the incoming packet for a duration defined by the
scanning window Tw. While it is possible to use a continuous
scanning (i.e., by setting Tw = Ts) to increase the packet
receiving rate, such a scanning approach has an adverse effect
on the energy consumption.
IV. RISK CLASSIFICATION
Besides using proximity sensing to detect the approximate
interaction distance between any two individuals, we also
consider the interaction time when labeling the individual into
low or high risk.
5Fig. 4. RSS distributions for two types of proximity: far (blue color bars)
and close (orange color bars).
A. Proximity Sensing
Proximity sensing has been employed in many scenarios,
for example, to identify the user proximity to museum collec-
tion [27], gallery art pieces [28], etc. Some works study the
proximity detection in a dense environment [29], or proximity
accuracy with filtering technique [30]. However, most of these
works study the proximity detection between a human and an
object with an attached BLE beacon [31]. So far, there is no
work studying the proximity sensing between devices carried
by two humans. While estimating the distance can help to
check if the user maintains a safe physical distancing, an exact
2 m distance should not be a rigid requirement in classifying
the risk of a user. Rather, we are more interested to know
the proximity between any two workers, and how long they
remain in proximity. Then, we can forward these pieces of
information to the epidemiologists and they can decide to
classify a contact as high or low risk. BLE is an excellent
technology for the above purpose since BLE is a short-range
communication that can only be heard when two smartwatches
are in the communication range of each other. Upon receiving
the advertising packet, the smartwatch can measure the RSS
and thus estimate its proximity to the nearby smartwatch. We
classify the proximity into two classes, i.e., far and close. We
define close proximity when the distance between any two
smartwatches is less than 2 m, and any distance greater than
2 m but less than the broadcasting range is considered far. In
other words, the two smartwatches are not in proximity if they
are outside the broadcasting range of each other.
The RSS distributions for far and close proximity is shown
in Fig. 4. It is clear that there would be errors if proximity were
decided by simply setting an RSS threshold. For example,
if we set anything above −80 dBm as close proximity,
chances are some values greater than −80 dBm are from the
smartwatch located at a distance greater than 2 m. Hence, it
is unreliable to identify the risk of an individual simply based
on the proximity. At the same time, some individuals might
come in very close proximity when they pass by each other.
Hence, we also consider the interaction time when we want
to identify the risk of an individual.
B. Hypothesis to Risk Classification
While it is more likely to be infected when the individual
is in close proximity to the infected person, the risk of getting
Far Close
Short
Long
Proximity
time
Low-risk
High-risk
Fig. 5. The individual is considered in the high-risk group of being infected
when he/she is in close proximity with the infected individual or has spent
a very long time with the infected individual within a confined space even
though the proximity between them might be high.
infected is relatively low if the individual only spends less
than 1 second in such close proximity. On the other hand, the
risk of getting infected can be high if the individual spends a
very long time together with the infected person even if they
are not in very close proximity. While the exact definition
should be left to the epidemiologists, we can provide them
with the necessary information which includes the distance
and the time of the interaction. The possible risk of getting
infected with respect to the proximity and interaction time
between the individual and the infected person is shown in
Fig. 5.
The problem of classifying the risk of a potential contact
can be modeled as a binary hypothesis test. Let x be an
m-dimensional feature vector and consider a risk mapping
function R : (x) −→ {+1,−1}, where +1 indicates high-risk
and −1 low-risk, then we have the following three hypotheses:
H0 : R(x) = 0
H+ : R(x) = +1
H− : R(x) = −1
(2)
where H+ denote the hypothesis that the user belongs to
the high-risk (+1) group, H− the hypothesis that the user
belongs to the low-risk (−1), and H0 the null hypothesis.
Specifically, the null hypothesis happens when the user is
risk-free, i.e., the user is outside the communication range of
the infected person. Obviously, miss detection is undesirable
because the user might be at risk but the system considers
the user safe. False-negative misclassified the high-risk user
to low-risk, this may give a wrong impression to the user
that the probability for them of getting infected is low, but
actually, the probability could be high. While false-positive is
a bit more conservative by misclassifying the low-risk user to
high-risk, it is a relatively safer outcome than miss detection
and false-negative.
C. Classification Models
We can apply supervised machine learning methods to
train a classification model. However, supervised methods
required a set of labeled data, which is not readily available
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Fig. 6. Classification model can be learned, validated and fine-tuned using
the collected data. The final model can be loaded to the smartwatch to classify
the risk of a user given a set of feature vectors stored in the smartwatch for
the previous 14 days.
in the context of smartwatches. In contrast to the abundant
and open-accessible sources of text-based (e.g., WikiLens,
BookCrossing, etc.) or image-based (e.g., MNIST, imageNet,
etc.) dataset, there are not dataset about the BLE signals
received by the smartwatch. To address this problem, we
developed an application on the smartwatch to collect the BLE
data. Given the collected data, we can train a classification
model, as shown in Fig. 6.
During the training phase, the data is split into training and
validation set before feeding the data for model learning. The
objective is to learn a set of weights that fits the hypothesis
function R(x, C) defined by the corresponding classification
model C. Validation is performed to evaluate the learned
model as well as preventing the model from overfitting. If
necessary, model fine-tuning can be performed to improve
the classification performance. Mathematically, the learning
process aims to fit the risk mapping function R : (x) −→ y
given a set of n training samples {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)},
where x = (x1, . . . , xm)T is an m-dimensional feature vector
and y = {+1,−1} is the classification output indicating the
risk of a user.
In this paper, we exploit four types of classifications:
decision tree (DT), linear discriminant analysis (LDA), naı¨ve
Bayes (NB) and k-nearest neighbors (kNN).
1) DT: Top-down approach is the commonly used method
to learn a classification tree. More precisely, DT starts by
choosing a feature from the feature vector that provides the
best splitting in connection to the target risk label, and then
repeats the same splitting procedures for each separate branch
until it reaches a final decision. Let θ = (x, γ) be the splitting
rule given feature x and threshold γ, we can split n samples
of training data T into two subsets, i.e.,
Tr(θ) = (x, y)|x ≤ γ
Tl(θ) = T \ Tr(θ)
(3)
where Tr and Tl are the resultant subsets representing the
data for right and left branches, respectively. The commonly
measure used to govern the splitting rule is the Gini impurity
G(·), which tells how likely the model will produce a misclas-
sification if the model predicts the labels based on the labels
distribution from a randomly chosen feature. Mathematically,
the Gini impurity can be computed as follows:
G(T , θ) = nl
n
H(Tl(θ)) + nr
n
H(Tr(θ)) (4)
where nl and nr are the number of training samples for each
subset, and H(·) is the entropy function, i.e.,
H(x) =
∑
y={+1,−1}
py(1− py)
= −
∑
y={+1,−1}
py log(py)
(5)
and py denotes the probability of correct classification. Sup-
pose that I = {1, 0} be the indication function and y˜ be the
predicted output, then we have
py =
1
n
∑
∀x∈x
I(y˜ = y) (6)
The objective of DT is to find the parameters that produce the
best splitting rule, i.e.,
θ∗ = argminG(T , θ) (7)
2) LDA: Assuming that the covariance for each class is the
same, LDA learns a classifier by fitting a Gaussian density to
each class. Let P(x|y˜ = y) be the conditional distribution for
each class y = {+1,−1}, by applying Bayes’ rule, we obtain
P(y˜ = y|x) = P(x|y˜ = y)P(y˜ = y)∑
y={+1,−1} P(x|y)P(y)
(8)
Then, the class (i.e., the risk) can be determined by selecting
the output with the highest posterior probability.
3) NB: Following a naı¨ve assumption that each feature is
conditionally independent, we can apply the Bayes’ theorem
to learn a classification model. By simplifying P(x|y,∀x ∈ x)
to P(x|y), we have
P(y|∀x ∈ x) = P(y)
∏m
i=1 P(x|y)
P(x)
. (9)
Since P(y|∀x ∈ x) is proportional to P(y)∏mi=1 P(x|y), then
we can use maximum a posteriori (MAP) to estimate the
probability for each class P(y) and the conditional probability
for each class given the feature P(x|y). The output risk can
then be predicted based on the following rule:
y˜ = argmax
y={+1,−1}
P(y)
m∏
i=1
P(x|y) (10)
4) kNN: The goal of kNN is to maximize the probability
of correct classification. Let pi indicate the probability that
a training sample i is classified correctly, according to the
stochastic nearest neighbors’ rule, we have:
pi =
∑
j∈Ti
pij (11)
7(a) (b)
Fig. 7. When any two persons come close to each other, (a) the smartwatch
vibrates with an alert, and (b) it also push a notification to remind the users
to practice safe physical distancing.
where Ti is a subset of data belonging to the same class as
training sample. Given pi, the goal of kNN can be defined as
follows:
argmax
y={+1,−1}
n∑
i=1
pi (12)
Note that all the classifiers described above can be further
extended by assuming different distribution functions. One of
the possible future work is to calibrate the classifier based
on the prior empirical distribution knowledge about a certain
environment. More precisely, different environments might
produce different distributions, and if we can acquire this
information, it could help to better calibrate the classifier and
thus improve the classification performance.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATIONS
We consolidated the collected data from both smartwatches
before dividing them into training and testing datasets. Then,
we evaluate the experimental results obtained from different
classifiers.
A. Experimental Setup with Smartwatch
For the experiment, we used Fossil Sport, a smartwatch
based on Google’s Wear OS 2.17. The smartwatch is powered
by a Qualcomm Snapdragon Wear 3100 processor and has an
internal memory of up to 1 GB. The 8 GB internal storage is
sufficient to store the generated and observed signatures for at
least 14 days. The small form factor (i.e., 1.28 in AMOLED
screen with 44 mm case size and 12 mm case thickness) makes
the smartwatch an ideal candidate for contact tracing in the
workplace. As shown in Fig. 7, the smartwatch can trigger the
alert automatically when any two smartwatches are in close
proximity to each other.
We programmed the smartwatch to broadcast the advertising
packet in the background. For experimental purposes, we
also programmed the application to log all the advertising
packet it received at every distance. In particular, the following
information will be logged: the ground truth distance, name
of the smartphone, MAC address of BLE chipset, the packet
payload, RSS values, time elapsed, and timestamp. The time
elapsed indicates the time difference between the previous
broadcast packet and the current broadcast packet, whereas the
timestamp is the exact time when the smartphone received the
5 𝑚 5𝑚
(a) Direct (b) Crosswise
Fig. 8. Four combinations of smartwatch on hand’s position have been tested,
i.e., left hand to right hand (LR), right hand to left hand (RL), left hand to left
hand (LL) and right hand to right hand (RR). These four combinations can be
classified into two categories: (a) direct line (LR and RL) and (b) crosswise
line (LL and RR).
TABLE I
TOTAL DATA FROM EACH COMBINATION
Combination Total Data Points
RR 8168
LL 7874
RL 13117
LR 8485
packet. We performed the experiment by asking two volunteers
to stand at a certain distance from each other, from 0.5 m up
to 5 m, as illustrated in Fig. 8. A measuring tape is used as a
reference to the ground truth distance.
We first performed the experiment by asking volunteer A to
wear the smartwatch on her left hand, and volunteer B on her
right hand (i.e., left to right (LR)). After that, we repeated the
same experiment with right hand to left hand (RL), left hand
to left hand (LL), and right hand to right hand (RR). Since LR
and RL constitute a direct line between two smartwatches and
LL and RR constitute a crosswise line, we categorize these
four hand-combinations into two groups: a) direct line, and
b) crosswise line. All the measurement data is saved into a
“comma-separated values” (.csv) file format and exported to
Matlab for training and testing.
B. Data Preparation and Processing
In total, we have collected 37,644 data points from all the
four combinations, as shown in Table I. We consolidated the
data from RR and LL into a single dataset (i.e., the crosswise
dataset) and then apply an 80%–20% splitting rule to split
the data into training and testing set. Similarly, we applied
the same splitting rule to the consolidated data from RL and
LR (i.e., the direct dataset). For each training and testing
set, the first four columns indicate the input features and
the last column is the target label (i.e., the risk). These four
input features include the number of samples observed by the
smartwatch, mean RSS, maximum RSS, minimum RSS, and
the RSS range (i.e., maximum RSS − minimum RSS). Note
that the number of samples observed by the smartwatch tells
how long the smartwatch being in proximity to each other. The
final training and testing data for both sets are shared openly
in our GitHub repository [32].
8TABLE II
THE PERFORMANCE OF EACH CLASSIFIER FOR THE DIRECT DATASET
Classifier Precision Recall F1-score AccuracyMean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
DT 0.9670 (0.9653, 0.9686) 0.9330 (0.9305, 0.9353) 0.9497 (0.9483, 0.9511) 0.9416 (0.9400, 0.9431)
LDA 0.8600 (0.8572, 0.8628) 0.8439 (0.8406, 0.8472) 0.8518 (0.8497, 0.8541) 0.8293 (0.8268, 0.8318)
NB 0.9562 (0.9548, 0.9577) 0.9127 (0.9099, 0.9152) 0.9339 (0.9324, 0.9355) 0.9228 (0.9212, 0.9247)
kNN 0.8853 (0.8828, 0.8882) 0.9170 (0.9145, 0.9194) 0.9009 (0.8994, 0.9028) 0.8889 (0.8872, 0.8909)
TABLE III
THE PERFORMANCE OF EACH CLASSIFIER FOR THE CROSSWISE DATASET
Classifier Precision Recall F1-score AccuracyMean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
DT 0.9176 (0.9140, 0.9208) 0.9133 (0.9104, 0.9157) 0.9154 (0.9133, 0.9175) 0.9059 (0.9037, 0.9083)
LDA 0.7959 (0.7912, 0.8008) 0.8255 (0.8224, 0.8292) 0.8104 (0.8070, 0.8137) 0.7934 (0.7903, 0.7966)
NB 0.9247 (0.9212, 0.9272) 0.8622 (0.8590, 0.8650) 0.8924 (0.8902, 0.8948) 0.8763 (0.8739, 0.8788)
kNN 0.9392 (0.9354, 0.9422) 0.8270 (0.8238, 0.8319) 0.8795 (0.8767, 0.8820) 0.8573 (0.8541, 0.8600)
C. Evaluation Metrics
We used four metrics (i.e., precision (p), recall (r), F1-
score (f1) and accuracy (a)) to evaluate the performance of the
classifier. Let T+, T−, F+ and F− denote the true-positive,
true-negative, false-positive and false-negative, respectively,
then the above four metrics can be computed as follows:
p =
T+
T+ + F+
(13)
r =
T+
T+ + F−
(14)
f1 = 2
rp
r + p
(15)
a =
T+ + T−
T+ + T− + F+ + F−
(16)
Precision tells how many are actually in the high-risk of
all the classifier predicted as positive. In other words, high
precision indicates the classifier produces low false-positive,
which means the classifier is capable of avoiding create
unnecessary tension and anxiety to the people. Recall, on the
other hand, tells how many we predicted as high-risk are in
fact high-risk of being infected. In contrast to the accuracy
that considers the number of correctly classified true-positives
and true-negatives, F1-score considers the balance of precision
and recall. F1-score is a useful metric when false-negatives and
false-positives are important factors in evaluating the classifier
performance.
D. Experimental Results
We fed the two consolidated datasets, i.e., direct and cross-
wise datasets, to the four different classifiers (i.e., DT, LDA,
NB, and kNN) for training. We repeated the experiment 100
times with a different set of testing data. Specifically, we
randomly sampled 20% of data from the dataset for testing
purposes at every iteration. For each evaluation metric, we
show the mean result and its corresponding 95% confidence in-
terval (CI). An illustration of the F1-score distribution obtained
from DT with the 100 testing sets, is shown in Fig. 9. The
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Fig. 9. The histogram illustrates the F1-score distribution obtained from DT
with the 100 different testing sets. The area in between the black lines indicate
the 95% confidence interval.
overall mean results and 95% CI for both direct and crosswise
dataset are shown in Table II and Table III, respectively.
From both tables, we can see that all the classifiers achieve
satisfactory performance with high precision and recall. In
other words, the classifier did not penalize the recall in order to
achieve high precision. Hence, the F1-scores for both datasets
are high.
We also observed that the direct dataset gave a better per-
formance than the crosswise dataset. This can be explained by
the possible signal attenuation when the two hands are blocked
by the human body. Among all the classifiers, DT achieves the
best performance with the highest precision, recall, F1-score,
and accuracy. In Fig. 10, it shows the precision-recall curve
for (a) direct and (b) crosswise. The precision-recall curve
provides further insight into the trade-off between precision
and recall. Both plots indicate that DT achieves superior
performance with high precision and recall, whereas other
methods tend to trade-off the recall in order to achieve high
precision.
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Fig. 10. Precision-recall curves for the two types of dataset: (a) direct, (b) crosswise.
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Fig. 11. The effect of number of input features on the accuracy.
E. Implication of Input Features
Previously, we used all the five input features (i.e., number
of samples observed by the smartwatch, mean RSS, maximum
RSS, minimum RSS, and RSS range) to train the model. All
the four trained classifiers were able to produce satisfactory
classification performance, i.e., at least 85% accuracy. Hence,
we would like to investigate the implication of input features
on the classification performance. We repeated the experiment
by using only one feature (i.e., mean RSS), and then two
features (i.e., mean RSS and the number of samples), and
so on. The classification accuracy achieved by all the four
classifiers is shown in Fig. 11. From both bar charts, we can
see that kNN suffers severe performance degradation when
only one input feature available. Overall, the performance
increases when the number of features increases.
The performance gain of each classifier when the number of
features increases, is shown in Fig. 12. We can see that kNN
benefited a lot when there are more input features. On the
other hand, both LDA and NB did not show improvement after
two features. Their performance saturated when the number of
features is more than two. It can be noted that the performance
of DT also increases when the number of features increases,
even though the performance gain is quite minimal. Overall,
we can see that some features are indeed useful in training a
good model, while some features might be redundant and can
be excluded from training. For example, the maximum RSS
and minimum RSS might not provide good information to the
model training, whereas the RSS range provides more useful
information. The RSS range provides an indication of how big
the RSS fluctuated during a particular observation period, and
this piece of information is indeed helpful to model learning.
F. Implication of Number of Samples
As discussed, the number of samples observed by the
smartwatch within a certain continuous time period is a good
indication of how long the user has been interacting with each
other. Furthermore, we can make a better inference when the
number of samples observed by the smartwatch increases. The
effect of the number of samples on the classification accuracy
is illustrated in Fig. 13. It is clear that the accuracy increases
when the number of samples increases and then slowly satu-
rates after it obtains a sufficient number of samples. In other
words, the increase in the number of samples has less effect
on accuracy when the system has obtained a sufficient number
of samples to make an inference. From the results, we can see
that the accuracy starts to saturate when the number of samples
reaches 100, for the (a) direct and (b) crosswise cases. Hence,
we can conclude that most classifiers can produce proper
classification output when there are at least 100 samples. If the
smartwatch is configured to advertise the packet every 100 ms,
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Fig. 12. The histogram illustrates the F1-score distribution obtained from DT with the 100 different testing sets. The area in between the black lines indicate
the 95% confidence interval.
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Fig. 13. The effect of number of input samples on the accuracy.
we should expect approximately 10 samples per second, which
means that approximately 10 s are required for each classifier
to reach a stable performance. In practice, this is a reasonable
duration considering the interaction duration between users.
Furthermore, if the interaction duration is less than 10 s, the
risk of getting infected is low even if the user is very close to
the infected individual.
G. Implication of Physical Distancing Requirements
The World Health Organization recommends a distance of
at least one meter. However, different countries implement
different physical distancing requirements, from 2 m to 1
m, depending on factors including location, activity, and
age of the individuals. Considered the variations in physical
distancing requirements, we conducted an experiment to verify
our classification approach with different physical distancing
thresholds. The classification accuracy with different physical
distancing threshold is shown in Fig. 14. The results prove
the robustness of our classification approach, in which each
classifier achieves almost similar accuracy despite the differ-
ences in the physical distancing threshold. This means that
our proposed approach is practical and can be applied in any
setting directly by simply updating the physical distancing
threshold in correspondence to the set of required preventive
measures.
VI. CONCLUSION
Contact tracing is deemed to be an essential measure
in the post-pandemic to prevent the second outbreak while
slowly reopening the workplace. Even though smartphone-
based contact tracing is cost-effective considering the ubiquity
of smartphones, it is not convenient to have the employee
carry with them the smartphone all the time during working.
On the other hand, a smart wearable approach provides a
more practical solution to contact tracing in the workplace.
In this paper, we verify the practicality of our proposed P3CT
with real-world BLE data collected from the smartwatch. For
future work, we can integrate the embedded sensors within
the watch to monitor employee’s activity and thus to better
predict their interaction behaviors. The additional knowledge
of interaction behaviors, besides the interaction proximity and
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Fig. 14. The effect of physical distancing threshold on the accuracy.
duration, provide further information to estimate the risk of
being infected.
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